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"THE JUDGE WOULD THEN BE THE LEGISLATOR": DIS-
MANTLING SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE NAME OF
SENTENCING REFORM-Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647
(1989).
Abstract: In the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 Congress created the United States
Sentencing Commission, an independent agency in the judicial branch charged with
promulgating binding sentencing guidelines for federal crimes. In Mistretta v. United
States, the Supreme Court held that the Sentencing Reform Act does not violate separa-
tion of powers principles. This Note asserts that the Court misapplied separation of pow-
ers theory, and that the Sentencing Commission violates separation of powers in two ways.
First, by delegating to the judicial branch the authority to create sentencing guidelines
which have the effect of law, Congress impermissibly aggrandized the core function of the
judiciary. Second, judicial service on the Sentencing Commission encroaches upon the
core function of the judicial branch by threatening the impartiality and independence of
judges and reducing public confidence in the judiciary. This Note concludes that the
advantages of judicial service on the Sentencing Commission do not outweigh the detri-
ment to the judicial branch.
"Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and
liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the
judge would then be the legislator." 1
Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 19842 ("Sentencing
Reform Act") with the goal of creating a system of uniform and pro-
portionate sentencing which imposes similar sentences for similar con-
duct and different sentences for different conduct.3 The sentencing
guidelines system created by the Sentencing Reform Act achieves that
objective, virtually eliminating the possibility of judges imposing
widely divergent sentences for similar offenses.4 However, the sen-
tencing guidelines themselves are not set out or enacted by Congress.
Instead, the Sentencing Reform Act created the Sentencing Commis-
sion, to which Congress delegated the authority to promulgate the
guidelines that determine the sentences for federal crimes.5
After the Commission released the first set of sentencing guidelines,
confusion erupted in federal courts. Some courts invalidated the
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 315 (J. Madison) (E. Earle ed. 1976) (emphasis in original).
2. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3551-3586 (West 1985 & Supp. 1989) and 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 991-998 (West
Supp. 1989).
3. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL 1.2 (1988) [hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL].
4. Sentencing judges must impose sentence within the guidelines, unless the court finds that
an aggravating or mitigating factor exists that was not considered by the Sentencing
Commission. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b). Within the guidelines, the maximum of each range may
not exceed the minimum by more than 25 percent or six months, except that a minimum
sentence of 30 years may extend to a maximum of life imprisonment. 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(b)(2).
5. 28 U.S.C.A. § 991.
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guidelines and others upheld them.6 The issue reached the Supreme
Court in Mistretta v. United States,7 in which the Court held that the
Sentencing Reform Act did not violate the nondelegation or separa-
tion of powers doctrines.8 This Note focuses on the separation of pow-
ers aspect of Mistretta and the provision of Article III that defines the
constitutional role of the judiciary and judges. Close analysis shows
that the Sentencing Reform Act violates separation of powers princi-
ples because promulgating sentencing guidelines unconstitutionally
expands the powers of the judicial branch and unconstitutionally
impairs the core function of the judiciary.
I. SEPARATION OF POWERS, THE SENTENCING
REFORM ACT, AND MISTRETTA V UNITED
STA TES
A. Separation of Powers
The United States Constitution does not express the doctrine of sep-
aration of powers' in any specific provision, but divides the govern-
ment into three separate branches corresponding to the traditional
tripartite scheme of legislative, executive, and judicial branches.o The
first three articles of the Constitution establish the governmental struc-
ture, vesting the legislative powers in a Congress, I" the executive
power in a President, 2 and the judicial power in one Supreme Court
6. Defendants sentenced under the guidelines challenged their constitutionality. Violation of
separation of powers and nondelegation doctrines were the most common claims. The courts'
conclusions differed dramatically. See, e.g., Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245 (9th
Cir. 1988) (Sentencing Reform Act violates separation of powers); United States v. Johnson, 682
F. Supp. 1033 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (sentencing guidelines do not violate nondelegation doctrine).
7. 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
8. Id. at 675.
9. The fundamental premise of separation of powers theory is that the judicial, legislative, and
executive powers of government should not be combined. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 136 (1983).
10. The concept of separating the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government
originated from western European power struggles between monarchs and legislatures. Id. at
135-36. The philosophy most familiar to Americans at the time of the Constitutional
Convention was expressed in the writings of Montesquieu. He argued that intermingling of
legislative, executive, and judicial powers would lead to tyranny. 1 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT
OF LAWS 151-62 (T. Nugent trans. rev. ed. 1899). Montesquieu's theories had been emulated in
the early constitutions of the new states. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, Part the First, art.
XXX, reprinted in 5 W. SWINDLER, SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTIONS 96 (1975); VA. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 10 W. SWINDLER, supra, at 52.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I.
12. U.S. CONST. art. II.
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and other inferior courts established by Congress."3 Each of the arti-
cles enumerates the specific powers exercised by each branch.
While these enumerated powers each belong to one branch alone,
the Constitution allows partial intrusion by one or two branches into
the workings of another.14 For example, the President has the power
to appoint judges,15 and the Senate has the power to confirm or deny
the Presidential appointments.' 6 Only where the whole power of one
department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole
power of another department are separation of powers principles vio-
lated. 7 Thus, under the Constitution, neither the President, who pos-
sesses the whole executive power, nor Congress, which possesses the
whole legislative power, can exercise judicial power, but they may
appoint and confirm those who do. 8
The separation of powers among the branches may be violated in
two major ways.' 9 First, one branch may be aggrandized if the branch
is assigned powers more appropriately exercised by another branch.20
Second, one branch may be encroached upon if the actions of another
branch prevent the first branch from performing its constitutionally
assigned function.21
13. U.S. CONST. art. III.
14. James Madison addressed concerns about the lack of complete segregation of the
branches in Federalist No. 47. Madison argued that Montesquieu's theory did not demand
complete isolation among the branches. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 314-15 (J. Madison) (E.
Earle ed. 1976).
15. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
16. Id.
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 314-15. Madison relies on Montesquieu's theories. See
supra note 10.
18. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47. Federalist No. 51 explains that these partial links among
the branches may "be the means of keeping each other in their proper places." THE
FEDERALIST No. 51, at 336 (E. Earle ed. 1976).
19. When analyzing separation of powers cases, the Supreme Court has used historical
separation of powers theory as its foundation. See, eg., Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct.
647, 658-59 (1989). The Court's treatment of separation of powers parallels the historical
uncertainty about precisely how separate the powers of government should be. In some cases the
Court has required strict separation of the three branches. See, eg., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714 (1986). In other cases the Court has permitted some intermingling among the branches,
analyzing whether the action of one branch intrudes upon the "core function" of another. See,
e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); see also Krent,
Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REv. 1253, 1255 (1988).
Commentators have characterized the Court's seemingly inconsistent approaches as "formalist"
(requiring strict separation) and "functional" (permitting a more flexible approach). Id. at 1254.
Distinction between the two theories is unnecessary under this Note's analysis of Mistretta,
because the same conclusion results from either theory.
20. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2613 (1988).
21. Comment, Separation of Powers and Judicial Service on Presidential Commissions, 53 U.
Cm. L. REv. 993, 1004-06 (1986).
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1. Aggrandizement: The Expansion of Powers Test
The Supreme Court has found that the separation of powers doc-
trine may be violated by one branch expanding or aggrandizing its
constitutionally assigned powers.22 The case or controversy provision
of Article III narrowly defines the function of the judiciary as deciding
cases and controversies, 3 but some activities besides specifically adju-
dicating cases and controversies have been found judicially appropri-
ate.24 Thus, the expansion of powers test states that judges may not
perform any government activities that are not within the judicial
sphere.2 5
2. Encroachment. The Impairment of Function Test
Separation of powers principles also may be violated when the
actions of one branch encroach upon another branch, preventing the
other branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned func-
tions.26 The Supreme Court has established a two-part test for uncon-
stitutional encroachment. 27  The first step is to determine whether
action by one branch has the capacity to prevent another branch from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.2 8 If it does, the
second step is determining whether the impact is justified by an over-
riding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority
of the acting branch.29
22. Id. at 1006-09. Such expansion of powers may not necessarily encroach upon the
function of another branch. Id.
23. See infra notes 30-35 and accompanying text. The limitation of Article III makes it fairly
easy to identify actions outside the realm of the judiciary. Expansion of the legislative and
executive functions is more difficult to test, because executive and legislative actions may overlap.
Comment, supra note 21, at 1007; see also infra note 86.
24. See infra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
25. Comment, supra note 21, at 1008. "Government activities" include legislative functions
and executive functions. Both are outside the judicial sphere. Id. at 1007-08 n.80. Approval of
the expansion of power by the other branches does not remedy the constitutional deficiency when
the exercised power is clearly outside the domain of the exercising branch. Id. at 1009. For
example, the Supreme Court has overturned congressionally authorized expansions of judicial
power. See, e.g., Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923) (holding
unconstitutional a provision of a congressional act giving the Supreme Court power to hear
appeals of decisions concerning rates and regulations of a public utility commission).
26. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
27. Id. The Court articulated the two-part test in Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., but
did not clearly apply the test.
28. Id.
29. Id. The Court applied the two-part test in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), in
determining that the President is immune from damages based on the President's official acts.
Id. at 754. The question was whether the action of the judicial branch in hearing the case would
impair the function of the executive branch. The Court first determined that subjecting a
President to civil liability could impair the functioning of the executive branch by influencing the
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3. The Judiciary's Core Function: The Case or Controversy
Requirement
Article III of the Constitution defines the function of the judicial
branch as deciding cases and controversies.3 0 The Supreme Court his-
torically has limited that function to resolving real disputes between
adverse parties.3 ' The Court has refused to issue advisory opinions.3 2
The Court also has refused to permit Article III judges3 to decide
claims when the determinations would not be final, but instead would
be reviewable by the executive branch or Congress.34 The Court held
that executive and legislative activities cannot be imposed on Article
III judges.35
The Supreme Court has also declined to decide cases involving
"political questions,"36 although these cases usually meet the case or
controversy requirement.37 The Court will not decide cases that
involve issues committed by the Constitution to another branch, lack
judicially discoverable or manageable standards for resolution, or
President's actions. Id at 749-50. The Court then determined that resolution of a private suit
for damages was not a sufficiently overriding need to justify intrusion on the functions of the
executive branch. Ia at 754.
30. U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2.
31. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911).
32. In 1793, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson asked the Supreme Court to advise the
executive on certain legal questions. In response, Chief Justice Jay wrote that "the lines of
separation drawn by the Constitution between the three departments of the government" and the
Supreme Court's role as "a court in the last resort, are considerations which afford strong
arguments against the propriety of our extrajudicially deciding the questions alluded to ......
Letter from Chief Justice Jay to President Washington (July 20, 1793), reprinted in P. BATOR, P.
MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 65 (2d ed. 1973).
33. Article III of the Constitution states that these judges, appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate, shall have life tenure in office and shall receive compensation which
may not be diminished during their term of office. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1.
34. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 409 (1792).
35. Id. Five Supreme Court justices expressed formal opinions that a duty imposed on the
judicial branch by Congress could not be executed as a judicial power when the decision was
subject to revision by an executive officer and Congress. The Supreme Court confirmed the
principle of Hayburn's Case in United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1851). In
Ferreira, Congress passed a law authorizing certain judges to adjudicate claims arising from a
treaty, after which the Secretary of Treasury would pay the claims if he thought they were just
and equitable. Id. at 46-47. The Supreme Court held that the power to decide the claims was not
a judicial function, because there was neither lawsuit nor parties. Id. at 46.
36. The political question doctrine holds that certain matters are political in nature and
should be resolved by the body politic rather than the courts. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, supra note 9, at 109.
37. Political question cases involve real disputes and real parties; it is the nature of the dispute
that creates a political question. See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (Court
could not adjudicate trespass action because deciding the case would require making the political
determination of which state government was the lawful regime).
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require an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judi-
cial discretion.38
4. Judicial Rulemaking
Despite the case or controversy principle, the judiciary has been
permitted to perform some tasks not strictly within the scope of adju-
dicating cases. The judiciary may create and enforce rules to "put [its]
own house in order.",39 Such permissible rulemaking authority has
included adoption by the Supreme Court of the Federal Rules of Civil,
Criminal, and Appellate Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence,
and Bankruptcy procedure rules.4 Lower federal courts may also
"make and amend rules governing [their] practice," as long as the
rules are consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4'
The Supreme Court has found that such rulemaking is not outside
the judicial power because it is auxiliary to the judiciary's core func-
tion of deciding cases and controversies.42 Chief Justice Marshall vali-
dated this type of judicial rulemaking in Wayman v. Southard,43 where
he wrote for the Court that Congress could confer to the judicial
branch the authority to make laws necessary and proper for the
administration of the courts.44
Specifically, the judicial branch is permitted to make rules to regu-
late its own processes.45 In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,46 the Court held
that Congress may delegate power to regulate the practice and proce-
dure of federal courts to the Supreme Court or other federal courts.
47
The Court stated that such rules must regulate procedure, which the
Court defined as the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law.4 8
38. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (guaranty clause of Constitution assigns
protection of state governments to political branches).
39. Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 85 (1970).
40. See J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 61-75 (1977).
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
42. Chandler, 398 U.S. at 111 (Harlan, J., concurring); see Comment, supra note 21, at 1022
n. 127.
43. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43 (1825).
44. Id. at 22. Marshall established that the judiciary's power to decide cases and
controversies extends to the power to make laws for executing the judgments which the judicial
branch has power to pronounce. Id.
45. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941).
46. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
47. Id. at 9-10.
48. Id. at 14; see infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
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In addition to the enabling acts which empower the judicial branch
to make procedural rules,4" Congress has created judicial councils
authorized to make rules for the administration of court business, 50 as
well as administrative bodies designed to improve court practices and
procedures.51 Like the rules of procedure, these exceptions from the
case and controversy rule are housekeeping arrangements which do
not detract from or add to the judiciary's adjudicative purpose. 2
B. The Sentencing Reform Act and Sentencing Commission
The Sentencing Reform Act eliminates indeterminate sentencing
and parole.5 3 In the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress created the
Sentencing Commission, an independent commission in the judicial
branch. 4 The Commission consists of seven voting members
appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate.55 Commissioners serve for six-year terms, except that the terms of
the first Commissioners are staggered. 6 At least three of the members
are to be federal judges.5 7 The President has the power to remove
members of the Commission for neglect of duty, malfeasance in office,
or other good cause.5
The Sentencing Commission is charged with promulgating sentenc-
ing guidelines that carry out the four purposes of sentencing,59 provide
49. See, eg., 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 3771-72 (1982) (empowering the Supreme Court to prescribe
rules of criminal procedure).
50. Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 86 n.7 (1970).
51. Examples of such bodies include the Judicial Conference and the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts. The purpose of the Judicial Conference is to promote uniformity of
management procedures and expeditious conduct of court business. 28 U.S.C.A. § 331 (West
1968 & Supp. 1989). The Administrative Office controls coui-t administration and personnel
matters. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-611 (West 1968 & Supp. 1989).
52. Comment, supra note 21, at 1022.
53. S. RE'. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3182, 3248 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 225]. The prior system of indeterminate sentencing
allowed judges to sentence within the limits of no penalty and the maximum penalty set out in
the statute defining the crime. Id. at 3222-29. The parole system further increased the
ambiguity of sentences. Id. at 3223, 3229-32. The Sentencing Reform Act attempts to eliminate
unwarranted sentencing disparities. Id. at 3235.
54. 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(a).
55. Id.
56. Id. § 992(a). The Sentencing Reform Act provides that on the first Commission two
members will serve terms of six years; three members will serve terms of four years; and two
members will serve terms of two years. Id.
57. Id. § 991(a).
58. Id.
59. Id. § 991(b)(l)(A). Congress stated that the four purposes of sentencing were
punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and education. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(2).
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certainty and fairness in sentencing,' and reflect advancement in
knowledge of human behavior in the context of the criminal justice
process. 6 1 Congress directed the Commission to establish a system of
sentencing ranges for every category of offense and category of defend-
ant. Congress listed factors for the Commission to consider when for-
mulating the offense and defendant categories.6 2 For any crime, the
Commission may not exceed the maximum penalty provided in the
statutory definition of the crime.6 3
C. Mistretta v. United States
The Supreme Court held in Mistretta v. United States 64 that the sen-
tencing guidelines promulgated by the Sentencing Commission are
constitutional, because Congress did not violate separation of powers
principles. 65 The Court based its separation of powers holding on four
determinations. The Court first determined that the location of the
Commission in the judicial branch is permissible because the Commis-
sion's nonadjudicatory functions do not invade the prerogatives of
another branch.66 The Court wrote that although Article III of the
Constitution limits the judicial power to deciding cases and controver-
sies, judicial rulemaking is permitted where the rules are necessary and
proper for executing the judgments which the judicial department has
the power to pronounce. 67 Finding that the sentencing guidelines are
necessary and proper for sentencing, the Court held that the extrajudi-
cial activity of promulgating sentencing guidelines is consonant with
the integrity of the judicial branch and is not more appropriate to
another branch.6 8
60. 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(b)(1)(B).
61. Id. § 991(b)(1)(C).
62. Offense factors for the Commission to consider are the grade of offense; aggravating and
mitigating circumstances; harm caused by the crime; community view of the gravity of the crime;
public concern generated by the crime; deterrent effect of the sentence; and the current incidence
of the offense. Id. § 994(c). Defendant factors for the Commission to consider are age;
education; vocational skills; mental and emotional condition; physical condition, including drug
addiction; previous employment record; family ties and responsibilities; community ties; role in
the offense; criminal history; and dependence on crime for a livelihood. Id. § 994(d).
63. 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(b)(1) requires the Commission to establish sentencing ranges
consistent with all pertinent provisions of title 18, United States Code.
64. 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
65. Id. at 675. The Court also held that Congress did not violate the nondelegation doctrine.
Discussion of the nondelegation doctrine is beyond the scope of this Note.
66. Id. at 661-64.
67. Id. at 663.
68. Id. at 663-64.
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Second, the Court determined that promulgation of sentencing
guidelines is appropriate to the central mission of the judicial
branch.69 The Court found that locating the Commission in the judi-
cial branch did not undermine the integrity or unconstitutionally
expand the powers of the judicial branch.7° The Court additionally
asserted that because judges always have had the power to pronounce
sentences, promulgation of sentencing guidelines does not give the
judiciary any more power than it always has possessed.71 Based on the
judiciary's traditional role in sentencing, the Court held that promul-
gation of sentencing guidelines is merely the creation of court rules to
regulate sentencing and is therefore an appropriate task for the judicial
branch.72
Third, the Court determined that judicial service on the Sentencing
Commission does not impair the function of the judicial branch.73
The Court found that service of judges on the Commission does not
threaten the impartiality or independence of the judicial branch.74
Therefore, the Court found, service of judges on the Commission will
not affect judges' ability to adjudicate cases.75
Fourth, the Court determined that the President's power to appoint
and remove members of the Commission does not prevent the judicial
branch from performing its constitutionally assigned functions.76 The
Court pointed out that the President's power to elevate judges or
tempt them away from the bench with executive branch positions has
never been considered a threat to the integrity of judges,77 nor did the
Court find it likely that judges would conduct their activities in any
particular way to win a position on the Sentencing Commission.78
Furthermore, the Court wrote, although the President may remove
members of the Commission for cause, the removal power extends
only to the Commission itself.79 The President has no power to affect
the tenure or compensation of judges in their judicial capacity. 0
69. Id. at 664-67.
70. Id. at 665.
71. Id. at 666.
72. Id. at 667.
73. Id. at 671-72.
74. Id. at 672, 673.
75. Id. at 672.
76. Id. at 673-75.






Justice Scalia dissented from the majority opinion.8 He wrote that
lawmaking power can be exercised only by Congress, except in con-
junction with the lawful exercise of executive or judicial power.8 2 Jus-
tice Scalia argued that although the Commission is "located" within
the judicial branch, the Commission's power is legislative,83 and that
the Commission has no place except within the legislative branch.84
II. THE DISINTEGRATION OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
BOUNDARIES: AGGRANDIZEMENT AND
ENCROACHMENT OF THE JUDICIAL
BRANCH
The Supreme Court erred when it decided in Mistretta that the sen-
tencing guidelines promulgated by the Federal Sentencing Commis-
sion are constitutional. Although Congress may delegate the power to
promulgate some guidelines, Congress violated the separation of pow-
ers among the branches by creating the Sentencing Commission within
the judicial branch and mandating service of Article III judges on the
Commission. The Sentencing Commission simultaneously aggran-
dizes and encroaches upon the constitutional function of the judicial
branch.
A. Aggrandizement: The Sentencing Commission Impermissibly
Expands the Function of the Judicial Branch.
The Supreme Court's conclusion that Congress did not violate the
Constitution by delegating authority to the Sentencing Commission is,
standing alone, probably accurate.85 However, although Congress
may delegate much authority without Constitutional violation, the
results of the delegation must not offend separation of powers restric-
tions. The result of Congress' delegation to the Sentencing Commis-
sion is that members of the judiciary exercise powers more
appropriately exercised by Congress.86 The legislative behavior of the
81. Id. at 675 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 678.
83. Id. at 679-80.
84. Id. at 683.
85. The Court evaluates congressional delegation under an "intelligible principle" test,
requiring Congress to lay down an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized
to exercise the delegated authority is directed to conform. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct.
647, 654 (1989). The Supreme Court will rarely choose to second-guess Congress' assessment of
how much delegation is appropriate. See id. at 677 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. The Sentencing Commission is also executive in nature. Most of Congress' delegation to
executive agencies does not aggrandize the executive branch. See supra note 23. The sentencing
guidelines are similar to the regulations that Congress may empower executive agencies to issue.
258
Vol. 65:249, 1990
Dismantling Separation of Powers
Sentencing Commission in promulgating substantive rules aggrandizes
the function of the judicial branch.
1. The Sentencing Commission Makes Legislative Decisions.
The sentencing guidelines, once promulgated by the Commission,
are similar to legislation and have the force of law. 7 Such exercise of
legislative authority is outside the Constitutional function of the judi-
cial branch and, therefore, unconstitutionally aggrandizes that branch.
The Sentencing Commission makes many decisions which are more
appropriate to the legislative branch than the judicial branch. First,
the Sentencing Commission sets the punishments for crimes by deter-
mining the sentences for crimes. 8 It is well established that "the
authority to define and fix the punishment for a crime is [a] legislative"
task.89 Determining the relative weights of crimes is a political task
properly left to Congress. 90 Because the sentences establish the pun-
ishment for crimes, 91 defining and fixing the limits of sentencing is a
legislative task.
Second, the Sentencing Commission makes policy decisions by
determining the relative severity of federal crimes. 92 A judge passing
sentence on an individual defendant under specific facts must deter-
mine how the defendant's actions correspond to the societal value of
the crime. The Sentencing Commission, in establishing sentences for
Some lower courts, in deciding upon the constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission,
characterized the Commission as part of the executive branch. See United States v. Johnson, 682
F. Supp. 1033 (W.D. Mo. 1988). But see Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1258-59
(9th Cir. 1988) (court could not recharacterize the Commission as part of the executive branch,
when Congress had located the Commission in the judicial branch). In many cases challenging
the guidelines, the government and Commission urged the courts to characterize the Sentencing
Commission as an executive agency. See, eg., Gubiensio-Orthz 857 F.2d at 1035.
It is not necessary to determine whether the Commission's function is legislative or executive
to determine that it is nonjudicial. Any nonjudicial government function is likely to involve
some legislative or executive facets. Judges should not exercise such functions even when the
activities cannot be precisely characterized as either legislative or executive. Id. at 1259 n.8; see
also Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2612 (1988) (governmental duties of a nonjudicial
nature may not be imposed on judges holding office under Article III of the Constitution).
87. Guidelines and subsequent amendments automatically go into efflect six months after the
Commission submits them to Congress, unless Congress enacts a law to the contrary. 18
U.S.C.A. § 3551 note; 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(p).
88. Gubiensio-Ortiz, 857 F.2d at 1254.
89. Exparte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916); see also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,
283 (1980).
90. See Gubiensio-Ortiz 857 F.2d at 1254-1256; see also Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct.
647, 676-77 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91. Punishment is one of the four stated purposes of sentencing. 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a)(2)(A).
92. Gubiensio-Ortiz, 857 F.2d at 1255-56.
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all defendants under all facts, actually determines the societal values of
federal crimes. The sentencing guidelines promulgated by the Com-
mission have an effect similar to the maximum sentences set out in
legislative definitions of crimes-both reflect policy judgments con-
cerning the severity of the crime and the appropriate level of
punishment. 93
Third, the Sentencing Commission decides appropriate sentences
for an entire class of defendants. 94 The sentencing guidelines apply to
all potential defendants, while the sentences pronounced by judges
apply only to individual defendants under specific facts. In sentencing
an individual defendant, a judge determines the relevant law-the stat-
utory penalties for the crime-and then applies the law to the facts.
When the judiciary promulgates the guidelines under which judges
will pronounce sentence, the judiciary is not just deciding which law to
apply, but is also drafting that law, which is a legislative task.
By assigning to the Sentencing Commission these policymaking
responsibilities more appropriately exercised by the legislative branch,
Congress has aggrandized the function of the judicial branch beyond
its proper role of deciding cases and controversies. The Supreme
Court has recognized the inappropriateness of judicial policy-making,
even within the proper function of the judicial branch, when it has
refused to decide cases involving political questions.95 In the case of
the Sentencing Commission, the exercise of political judgments by a
commission within the judicial branch impermissibly expands the role
of the judiciary.
2. Sentencing Guidelines Are Substantive, Not Procedural, Rules.
The Sentencing Commission's powers are outside the Constitution's
limitation of the judicial power to cases and controversies.96 Permissi-
ble exceptions to the case or controversy limitation all concern judicial
activities relating solely to the internal procedural functioning of the
judicial branch.97 The substantive aspects of the sentencing guidelines
render judicial service on the Commission impermissible.
93. While judges also make policy judgments about the relative values of crimes when
sentencing individual defendants, sentencing decisions limited to individual defendants are
properly within judges' function of deciding cases and controversies. See supra notes 30-35 and
accompanying text.
94. Gubiensio-Ortiz, 857 F.2d at 1255-57.
95. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
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In Mistretta, the Supreme Court analogized the Commission's pro-
mulgation of sentencing guidelines to the judiciary's permissible
rulemaking tasks, such as the promulgation of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.98 However, the substantive sentencing policies made
by the Sentencing Commission differ vastly from procedural court
rules.99 The Rules Enabling Act authorizing the promulgation of the
Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provided that the rules could not
"abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." 1° In contrast,
sentencing rules actually define substantive rights, by establishing
what the punishment will be for a defendant convicted of a crime.1 01
For defendants who are found guilty, the guidelines do not merely
establish the procedures judges will use in deciding which sentence to
impose; they actually determine the amount of time defendants will
serve.102 Sentencing rules have as much significance to defendants as
the legislation that sets out the elements of the crime itself.
Furthermore, sentencing guidelines do not merely affect the internal
functioning of the judicial branch. Although Congress may give the
judicial branch power to make rules for executing the judgments that
it may pronounce,10 3 such rules should be limited to those which gov-
ern the processes of courts and trials."° If, as the Court implies in
Mistretta, the judiciary actually had the power to make any rules rele-
vant to its judgments, the judiciary would have potentially unfettered
discretion over the substantive outcomes of trials.105 Under this
98. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 664-65 (1989).
99. While admitting some difference between the nature of substantive sentencing policies and
procedural rules directing the processes of the courts, the Court rejected labels such as
"substantive" and "procedural." Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 665. However, the Court does not offer
any viable substitute. Without a yardstick to determine the extent of impermissible rulemaking,
delegation of rulemaking potentially could extend without limit. Furthermore, while the line
between substance and procedure may be unclear at times, the Court itself has employed the
distinction. In Miller v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that Florida's sentencing guidelines
were not procedural rules. 482 U.S. 423, 433-34 (1987).
100. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989).
101. See, e.g., Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987). In determining that an increase in
sentencing ranges under Florida's sentencing guidelines violated the ex post facto clause, the
Supreme Court in Miller had to determine whether the guidelines were substantive or
procedural. The Court held that the guidelines were substantive, because "the amendment was
intended to, and did, increase the 'quantum of punishment' for certain crimes." Id. at 433-34.
The guidelines promulgated by the Sentencing Commission also increased the sentencing range
for certain crimes. See infra notes 108-109.
102. See supra note 4.
103. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 663 (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 22
(1825)).
104. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
105. Cf Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (predicting potential delegation of
authority to expert medical commissions to make rules for federal medical policy).
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reasoning, because judges have the power to pronounce a defendant
guilty, Congress could delegate to the judicial branch power to pro-
mulgate rules as to what constitutes guilt. The sentencing guidelines
have a similar substantive effect on the outcomes of trials, because the
guidelines determine whether or not defendants will serve prison time,
and how long that time will be. The sentencing guidelines do not
merely aid the process of pronouncing sentences: they determine the
actual sentences.1
0 6
Substantive sentencing guidelines also differ from procedural court
rules because the guidelines affect people who are not in court. The
guidelines affect persons in the outside world, whether or not they are
ever involved in a trial. 107 Rules governing the admission of hearsay
in a trial or the proper time for filing pleadings affect only the litigants.
But rules that determine the penalties for crimes may affect behavior
before individuals get to court or even commit crimes.'' The weight
of the penalty may prevent potential criminals from acting or
encourage them to risk committing the crime.' 09
B. Encroachment: The Sentencing Commission Impairs the Core
Function of the Judicial Branch.
Service by federal judges on the Sentencing Commission impairs
judges in their function of considering and applying laws to cases and
controversies. Such service encroaches on the judiciary's function by
threatening the impartiality and independence of judges and reducing
public confidence in the judiciary."0 The need for judicial expertise
on the Sentencing Commission does not outweigh the impairment of
106. See Brief of Respondent-Petitioner John M. Mistretta at 24-25, Mistretta v. United
States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989) (Nos. 87-1904 and 87-7028); see also supra note 4.
107. See Gubiensio-Ortiz, 857 F.2d 1245, 1257 (9th Cir. 1988).
108. Individual sentences also may affect behavior patterns on a long-term basis. However,
this potential occurrence is a residual effect; the primary goal of individual sentencing is to
determine a just sentence for a single defendant under specific circumstances. The sentencing
guidelines, however, apply to all defendants and all future defendants. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(b).
The Commission intended to influence primary conduct by developing sentencing ranges that
would deter illegal behavior. For example, the Commission mandated prison terms for many
crimes where probation had previously been the norm, with the view that the prospect of prison
would act as a significant deterrent to many of those crimes. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL, supra note 3, at 1.9. While creating penalties that will deter crime is a worthy goal,
the task should be left to the legislative branch.
109. By stating that deterrence is one of the goals of sentencing, Congress demonstrated that
it intended the sentencing guidelines to influence primary conduct. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(2)(B).
The Commission that developed the first guidelines also stated that it believed that the prospect
of harsher penalties for certain activities would act as a significant deterrent. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, at 1.9.
110. See Comment, supra note 21, at 1011-19.
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the judicial function.111 Therefore, judicial service on the Sentencing
Commission is unconstitutional under the two-step Nixon v. Adminis-
trator of General Services separation of powers test. 12
1. Service on the Sentencing Commission Threatens Judges'
Impartiality.
The Supreme Court was partially correct when it stated in Mistretta
that the participation of federal judges in promulgating sentencing
guidelines would not affect judges' ability to impartially adjudicate
sentences.113 Because the sentencing guidelines restrict judges' discre-
tion in sentencing, even judges who have served on the Sentencing
Commission can dispassionately plug offense and defendant character-
istics into the guidelines to determine the Commission-mandated sen-
tence. However, the entanglement of federal judges in the political
work of promulgating sentencing guidelines threatens the impartiality
of the judiciary. 1 4
a. Judicial Service on the Sentencing Commission Lends an Aura of
Judicial Impartiality to the Political Work of the
Commission.
The aura of judicial impartiality exists to protect judges' core func-
tion of deciding cases and controversies. 5 Judges' neutrality and
impartiality, and public perception of that neutrality, are key elements
in judges' ability to decide cases effectively. 6 While the political
branches-the legislative and the executive-are subject to political
111. See Comment, supra note 21, at 1019-20.
112. The determination that Congress' action impairs the function of the judicial branch
satisfies the first part of the Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs. test. See supra notes 27-29 and
accompanying text. The determination that legitimate Congressional objectives do not outweigh
the impairment of the judicial function satisfies the second part of the Nixon v. Administrator of
Gen. Serv test. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
113. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 672 (1989).
114. The Supreme Court found that service of judges on the Sentencing Commission is not
objectionable because the members do not serve in their capacity as judges. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct.
at 671. However, it is not possible to separate the identities of judges as members of courts and
members of the Sentencing Commission. In the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress stated that
federal judges could serve as members of the Commission without resigning their judicial
appointments. 28 U.S.C.A. § 992(c). Furthermore, if the purpose of separating the powers of
the three branches is to prevent concentration of power in the same hands, it is irrelevant
whether a judge is acting as an individual or a court. See Comment, supra note 21, at 1009; see
also supra text accompanying note 17.
115. Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1263 (9th Cir. 1988).




pressure and influence, the judiciary is separated from political influ-
ences to preserve its impartiality and independence.' 17 By mandating
judicial service on the Sentencing Commission, Congress imposed the
image of judicial impartiality on the political work of the Commission.
Judicial participation in promulgating the sentencing guidelines
symbolically places a judicial seal of approval on the political and leg-
islative work of the Commission. By approving the guidelines devel-
oped by the Commission, the judges on the Commission have, in
effect, expressed their opinion that the guidelines are legal and
constitutional. 18
b. Judicial Service on the Sentencing Commission May Bias Judges
When Considering the Guidelines.
Judicial service on the Sentencing Commission further threatens
judges' impartiality because such service could predispose judges in
favor of the policies they or fellow judges helped promulgate." 9 When
a proposed set of guidelines goes into effect and becomes subject to
judicial review, the already existing judicial imprimatur may influence
judges when they consider the guidelines. Because other judges helped
compose the guidelines, reviewing judges may rely on respect for their
colleagues' judgment when determining the validity of the guide-
lines.' 2 ° A similar situation may occur when a sentencing judge
departs from or arguably misapplies the guidelines and the sentence is
appealed. Because the guidelines are the product of judges, other
judges may give them greater weight than had they been a mere polit-
ical product.
c. Recusal Will Not Solve the Threat to Judicial Impartiality.
In most cases, threats to judicial bias are solved by recusal.' 2 ' How-
ever, the possibility of recusal is impractical when it affects such a
primary judicial activity as pronouncing sentence. Although only
three judges were members of the original Sentencing Commission, the
six-year term of Commission service means that ultimately far more
117. Gubiensio-Ortiz, 857 F.2d at 1261.
118. All three judicial members of the Sentencing Commission approved the first set of
guidelines promulgated by the Commission. Gubiensio-Ortiz, 857 F.2d at 1262 n.15.
119. Comment, supra note 21, at 1011.
120. See id. at 1012-13.
121. Judges who perceive a threat to their impartiality in a specific case will decline to decide
the case or participate in its decision. See Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 672 (1989).
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judges will be affected. 22 And even for a small number of judges,
recusal in every case involving the sentencing guidelines would drasti-
cally limit their judicial capacities.123 Furthermore, disqualifying
judges who have served on the Sentencing Commission will not dimin-
ish the effects on other judges.12 4
2. Judicial Service on the Sentencing Commission Threatens Public
Confidence in and Respect for the Judiciary.
Whether judicial involvement in the sentencing guidelines actually
threatens judges' impartiality is only a part of the relevant inquiry.
Judges must not only be actually impartial; they also must appear
impartial to the public. This appearance of fairness is crucial to ensur-
ing public confidence in the judiciary.125
Although the Supreme Court in Mistretta admitted being "trou-
bled" by the possibility that judicial involvement in the sentencing
guidelines could undermine public confidence in the impartiality of the
judiciary,1 26 the Court glossed over the problem by comparing pro-
mulgation of sentencing guidelines to the judiciary's traditional role in
pronouncing sentence. 27 The Court ignored the distinction between
the judiciary's actual role of pronouncing sentence based on Congress'
political definitions of crimes, and the essentially political and legisla-
tive task of classifying ranges of sentences within which judges may
pronounce sentence. 28 In their sentencing duties, judges impartially
evaluate individual situations based on criteria set by Congress. When
judges have developed the guidelines within which they will pro-
nounce sentence, judges appear to lose their disinterestedness in adju-
dication, because they have a stake in the process.
122. Although the term for Commissioners is six years, the Act provides for an initial
staggering of terms. See supra note 56. Eventually, the result will be that at least three federal
judges will be appointed to the Commission within every six-year period.
123. Because sentencing is a primary activity of judges, no judge realistically could decline to
ever apply the sentencing guidelines.
124. Comment, supra note 21, at 1013; see supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
125. Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1262 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Hobson v.
Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 923 (D.D.C. 1967) (Wright, J., dissenting)).
126. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 672 (1989).
127. Id. at 673. The Court asserts that judicial experience with sentencing provides judges
with the expertise needed by the Commission. Id. However, judicial expertise does not cure
separation of powers problems. See infra notes 135-43 and accompanying text: Furthermore,
while delegating the authority to establish sentencing guidelines to federal judges who have
expertise in sentencing may be convenient and practical for Congress, "[c]onvenience and
efficiency are not the primary objectives-or the hallmarks-of democratic government."
Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983).
128. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
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3. Judicial Service on the Sentencing Commission Threatens the
Independence of the Judicial Branch.
Judicial service on the Sentencing Commission may endanger the
independence of the judicial branch by subjecting judges to the control
and influence of the executive branch. The President not only
appoints judges to the Commission, but also has the power to remove
members of the Commission for cause. 129
The Court correctly decided that the President's appointment
power is not a great risk to judicial independence, as the President
always has had the power to elevate judges to higher levels or tempt
them away from the judiciary with executive branch appointments. 130
However, the President's removal power, even though only for cause,
gives the President the control over federal judges that the Constitu-
tion's provision for life tenure was intended to prevent.13 The Court
dismissed the removal power because the Act does not authorize the
President to remove or diminish the status of Article III judges as
judges.'32 The Court ignores the potential diminution of status that
removal for cause would constitute for judges removed from the Com-
mission.133 Furthermore, because members of the Commission are
paid at the rate of courts of appeals judges, 134 removal from the Com-
mission would constitute a decrease in pay for district court judges
sitting on the Commission. Such control over judges by the executive
impermissibly threatens the independence of the judiciary, in both
appearance and actuality.
4. The Need for Judicial Experience and Viewpoint on the
Commission Does Not Outweigh the Impairment of the
Judicial Function.
Because service of judges on the Sentencing Commission impairs the
function of the judicial branch, the separation of powers inquiry turns
on whether the disruption of the judicial function may be justified by
an overriding need to promote objectives within Congress' constitu-
tional authority.' 35 In the case of the Sentencing Commission, the
129. 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(a).
130. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 674.
131. Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 1988).
132. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 674-75.
133. See Brief of Respondent-Petitioner John M. Mistretta at 34, Mistretta v. United States,
109 S. Ct. 647 (1989) (Nos. 87-1904 and 87-7028).
134. 28 U.S.C.A. § 992(c).
135. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977); see supra notes
26-29 and accompanying text.
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determination must be whether there is an overwhelming need for
active federal judges on the Sentencing Commission that outweighs
the impairment of the judicial branch caused by judicial service.
Because requiring service of active federal judges is only one potential
method of securing expert contribution to the Commission, the need
for such service does not outweigh the impairment it causes to the
judiciary.
The Senate Report on the Sentencing Reform Act'3 6 states that the
Sentencing Commission was located in the judicial branch because
Congress believed that sentencing should remain primarily a judicial
function.137 In Mistretta the Supreme Court also cited judges' role in
sentencing, and their accompanying experience and expertise, as justi-
fication for judicial service on the Commission. 3 ' However, Congress
could have obtained judicial input to the sentencing guidelines by
methods less burdensome than enlisting active federal judges for the
Commission. Former or retired federal judges could sit on the Com-
mission as adequately as active federal judges.'39 Alternatively, the
Commission could seek informal input from the judiciary by welcom-
ing comments and holding hearings.' 4°
Furthermore, the stated goals of the Sentencing Commission do not
establish that active federal judges are so indispensable that the need
for their service on the Commission overrides the need for separation
of powers. The first goal for the Commission is establishing sentenc-
ing policies that carry out the four purposes of sentencing: deterrence,
incapacitation, punishment, and rehabilitation.' Although these
may be the same goals judges have attempted to accomplish in individ-
ual sentencing, persons who have worked with criminals after sentenc-
ing are just as likely to be qualified to evaluate which sentences
actually succeed in achieving these goals. The second goal-providing
certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing' 42 is the
result of establishing a uniform system of guidelines, regardless of who
establishes the system. The third goal-creating sentencing policies
and practices that reflect advancement in knowledge of human behav-
ior in the context of the criminal justice process' 43-similarly does not
136. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 53.
137. Id. at 3342.
138. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 667, 673 (1989).
139. Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1264 (9th Cir. 1988).
140. The Commission did so with a preliminary draft of the first guidelines. Id.
141. 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(b)(1)(A).
142. Id. § 991(b)(1)(B).
143. Id § 991(b)(1)(C).
267
Washington Law Review
require judges' particularized knowledge. If professional legal per-
spective is crucial, lawyers, law professors, and former judges could
serve as competently as sitting judges. The need for judges' presence
on the Commission is not preponderant enough to outweigh the injury
their service does to the judicial function.
III. CONCLUSION
The Sentencing Commission violates separation of powers princi-
ples by simultaneously aggrandizing the role of the judicial branch
beyond constitutional limits and encroaching upon the core function
of the judicial branch. By making the legislative and political deci-
sions necessary to promulgate sentencing guidelines, the Sentencing
Commission impermissibly expands the function of the judiciary. At
the same time, service of Article III judges on the Sentencing Commis-
sion threatens the impartiality and independence of judges and reduces
public confidence in the judiciary, thus impairing the judiciary's ability
to impartially decide cases and controversies. While securing expert
contributions to the formulation of sentencing guidelines is a worthy
congressional goal, the need for judicial expertise on the Sentencing
Commission does not outweigh the impairment of the judicial
function.
Kristin L. Timm
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